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NON-REPRESENTATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: A
CENTENNIAL READING OF "THE PATH OF THE LAW"
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.

The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact... are what I mean by
the law.
The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.
Therefore, the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact can ask no
better justification than the deepest instincts of man.

On January 8, 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, delivered an address at the
dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law. His
speech was published in volume 10 of the HarvardLaw Review under the
title "The Path of the Law." It is generally regarded as the foundation stone
of the American Legal Realist movement-a movement which in the next
generation or two was to enlist virtually the entire legal profession of the
United States, and in later generations was to provide at least a starting
point for even its severest critics.
Mary Ann Glendon has suggested that Holmes did for the law what some
of his contempories did for the arts:
Holmes was a Picasso-like figure-larger than life, boldly iconoclastic,
yet mindful of his lineage and of the continuity ofI legal culture. "The
Path of the Law" was his Demoiselles of Avignon.

The comparison is not vitiated by the observation that Picasso tends to show
noses in profile, eyes in full face, and furniture from above. Holmes too
shifts perspective with elegant insouciance. Also like Picasso, he presents
exaggerated and distorted pictures of the realities he addresses. But there is
a major difference. People are in no danger of thinking that women really
look like Picasso's Demoiselles, while they are in real danger of thinking
that the law is really like Holmes's description in "The Path of the Law."
My object in the following critique is not to make light of either "The
Path of the Law" or its author. I am an American lawyer of my generation.
I cut my academic teeth on this essay. I went to class under what seemed
a more than life-size portrait of Holmes, and one of my favorite teachers
1. Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers (1994), p. 191.

264

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1997)

was his law clerk and biographer, Mark deWolfe Howe. Furthermore, his
intellectual categories, whether or not acknowledged, were and are
everywhere in American law. I can no more avoid being a follower of
Holmes than Molire's Bourgeois Gentilhomme could avoid speaking in
prose. Holmes is at least as important in law as Picasso in painting. All I
want to show here is that, like Picasso, he is not representational.
For this purpose, I will comment on particular passages in the order they
appear in the essay, and show that they are not consistent with the legal
enterprise as we actually know it, and often not consistent with each other.
The page references after the different passages are to volume 10 of the
HarvardLaw Review.
1.

"The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts." (p. 457)

This claim raises two questions. First, is the prediction referred to in fact
the object of the study of law, and, second, is the study of law the best way
to come at that prediction? Neither question admits of an unqualified
affirmative. Much of the study of law is addressed to transactional
lawyering, and good transactional lawyering involves not predicting the
courts but keeping away from them. Granted, one way to keep from the
courts is for everyone to know what will happen to a case when it goes
there. But a much better way is for transactions to be set up so clearly and
fairly that misunderstandings are prevented, and no one has a grievance to
litigate over. In many law school classes, when we study a case, we are less
interested in how the next one will come out than in how this one could
have been prevented.
But if we should want to find out what the courts will do next, it is not
always the person most learned in the law who is most apt to know. There
are whole levels of courts that politicians, bill collectors, caseworkers,
landlords, policemen, and newspaper reporters understand better than the
lawyers who practice in them, let alone the rest of the bar. At other levels
there are people who make their living as jury consultants, predicting what
kind of jurors will be most apt to vote for what kind of litigants. In the field
of personal injury, firms with suitable data bases make predictions that
lawyers will pay for, and insurance claims adjusters with neither data bases
nor law degrees make predictions that are probably as good.
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2.

"... a lawyer's statement of the case, eliminating as it does all the
dramatic elements with which his client's story has clothed it, and
retaining only the facts of legal import...." (p. 458)

Holmes goes on to explain that the lawyer eliminates the dramatic
elements because he foresees that those elements will make no difference in
the application of the public force. With the examples he uses-notably that
of the hat worn by one of the parties to a contract-he is probably right. But
with many dramatic elements he is quite mistaken. Ask any trial lawyer how
a particularly vivid color photograph of a mangled corpse will affect a
murder case or a wrongful death case. We keep such things out of our trials
not because we predict that they will not affect the outcome, but because we
predict that they will and we do not want them to.
3.

"... a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or
that way by judgment of the court." (p. 458)

If this is in fact the case, interesting consequences follow. The most
important is that I have no legal duty to do anything I can get away with
not doing, or not to do anything I can get away with doing. It can be
argued, I suppose, that the legal duty I used to think I had can be no great
loss if the law has no way of enforcing it. The moral duty, if there is one,
has not gone away, and in the absence of legal enforcement, my willingness
to live up to my moral duties is all that would stand in the way of my
violating the legal duty if there were one.
This reasoning disregards the moral obligation to obey the law. If, as St.
Thomas Aquinas puts it, a just law is binding in conscience, 2 then it would
seem that a legal duty might create a moral duty even if its breach had no
court-imposed consequences. Here is an example. Some years ago, the
constitution and laws of Indiana contained provisions forbidding all forms
of gambling. 3 Nevertheless, my university had an annual Mardi Gras
celebration with roulette wheels and the like, and several Catholic parishes
ran bingo games. Neither the police nor the prosecutor interfered in any way
with these games, and, given the mores and the politics of the community,
it could be confidently predicted that they would not do so in the future. But
when a new bishop took office, he stopped all gambling under church
auspices-not because he considered it immoral, but because it was against
the law. Under the language quoted here, it would seem that the bishop was
mistaken.

2. Summa Theologiae, I, 11, Q. 95, art. 5.
3. Indiana Constitution, Article 15, Section 8, repealed in 1988.
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Another consequence of this language is harder to pin down. It has to do
with the reference to suffering "in this or that way." If these words are to
be taken literally, the consequences of violating any legal duty are built into
the definition of the duty, so that it is impossible to attach new consequences without redefining the duty. Here is a hypothetical I use in class to
illustrate this point: a civil rights act has just been enacted, which makes it
an "unfair discriminatory practice" for a real estate broker to refuse to show
or sell a house on account of the race of the potential purchaser. The act
provides for enforcement through an administrative cease and desist order,
which a court on application will turn into a mandatory injunction. May the
licensing authorities suspend the license of a broker who violates this act?
If the statement that he has a duty not to discriminate is identical in meaning
to the statement that if he discriminates he will be subject to the enforcement procedures in the act, then the licensing authorities are usurping the
function of the legislature if they visit other sanctions on his discriminatory
practices. Whether we wish to limit the licensing authorities in this way
depends on our views of administrative law and civil rights. It seems inappropriate to define legal duties in such a way as to foreclose the question.
4.

"The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its
history Is the history of the moral development of the race. The
practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens
and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law and
morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and
understanding the law." (p. 459)

If, as Holmes seems to admit here, the law embodies moral judgments,
how can moral discernment and moral argumentation not be relevant to
predicting what the courts will do? If by "the difference between law and

morals" Holmes means the exclusion of moral reflection from legal
analysis-and various passages in the essay suggest that he does mean
that-this passage would seem to be self-contradictory.
5.

"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether Inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." (p. 459)

Here again, Holmes overlooks the moral obligation to obey the law.
While, as Holmes points out earlier on this page, a "bad man has as much
reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public
force," it is not true that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for
wishing to obey the law. As a general matter, good people would like to be
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law-abiding citizens. To that end, they need their legal advisers to help them
discern what the law requires, and relate these requirements to other claims
on their consciences. Lawyers who are not equipped to do that do not
understand their profession well enough to practice it.
In fact, good people, when they enter into legal transactions or when they
resolve disputes, combine moral and legal considerations in a great variety
of ways. Their lawyers must be prepared to follow them--and sometimes
lead them-through whatever combination may be required in a given case.
The literature of legal counseling is full of examples. 4 A testator wants to
know whether to tell his wife about the illegitimate child he fathered before
he met her. The parents of a young family want to know what to do about
a proposal to turn a neighboring mansion into a home for mentally disabled
adults. A member of a family business thinks he has been overreached by
his relatives. An understanding of the law is essential in resolving these
problems, and a bad man's understanding will not do.
6.

"The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing
else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and
that is all the difference." (p. 462)

This relates to a point I made a little earlier: Holmes has defined legal
duties in such a way that the sanction for breach of any duty is built into the
definition of the duty itself. As a result, he has to regard the sanction as an
alternative way of complying with the legal duty rather than a consequence
of not complying with it. "The law requires x on penalty of y," is simply
another way of saying that the law offers a choice between x and y. The
above quotation is the centerpiece of a substantial passage in which Holmes
develops this option. He begins (p. 461) by showing that there is no
significant difference between a tax and a fine: both are money payments
exacted of those who choose to do particular things. He goes on to show

that on the proper understanding of a contract, the parties have the option
of performing or paying damages.

To be consistent, he would have to say that committing a tort and paying
damages is an acceptable alternative to not committing the tort.. It appears
that recently some major manufacturers have in fact calculated their opiions
in just this way. But when discovery has brought up evidence of such a

4. The first of the following examples comes from Professor Teresa S. Collett. The
others are from Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clientsand Moral
Responsibility(1994).
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5
calculation, the courts have responded by imposing punitive damages.
Punitive damages are based on the willfulness of the defendant's conduct
and the ability of the defendant to pay. Their object is to keep committing
the tort and paying the damages from being a viable option for potential
tortfeasors. Presumably, the reason the courts wish to keep the tort from
being a viable option is that they already know it is not a legal one.
Punitive damages for breach of contract are rare-though not unknown.6
But where a breach of contract can be characterized as "willful"-as would
be the case if a party took seriously Holmes's offer of an option not to
perform--damages are often awarded for the mental distress caused by the
breach.7 Such damages are predicated on an understanding that the person
against whom they are awarded has done something wrong.
All this of course is to say nothing of what it would do to a person's
reputation in the business community for everyone to understand that he or
she felt free to make contracts and then pay damages instead of living up to
them. Holmes might respond that such a person's bad reputation would rest
on a moral, not a legal, judgment regarding his or her behavior. But I think
the moral judgment would rest on a perception of what the law required. A
good faith disagreement over what you have promised to do will not affect
your reputation in the same way as a pronouncement that you regard
keeping your promises as optional.

7.

"It is enough to take malice as it Is used in the law of civil liability
for wrongs... to show that it means something different in law
from what It means in morals... " (p. 463)

To make his point, Holmes describes an Elizabethan slander case
involving a preacher who told from the pulpit a story out of Fox's Book of
Martyrs.Although the story was both false and discreditable to the plaintiff,
the court said the preacher was not liable because he had meant no harm
and therefore had no malice.8 Holmes says that the rule of that case has
since been discredited. He refers in a footnote to a dissenting opinion of his
own in a Massachusetts case where the majority found a newspaper
publisher not liable for inadvertently naming the wrong man in an account
9
of a police court proceeding.
Holmes regards the preacher's case, and no doubt the prevailing opinion
in the newspaper case, as examples of an unfortunate failure to distinguish

5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908; W. Page Keeton, Prosserand Keeton on the
Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), pp. 9-15.
6. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355.
7. Ibid., § 353; "Damages," CorpusJurisSecundum § 69.
8. Greenwoodv.Prick,cited in Brook v. Montague, Cro. Jac. 90, 91, 79 Eng. Rep. 77,
78 (1605).
9. Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 34 N.E. 462 (1893).
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malice as a moral failing from malice as a ground for liability in a
defamation case. From the methodology he has laid down earlier in the
essay, I do not understand how he can find fault with the way a court
reasons, as long as his reading of its opinion will help him predict how it
will reason next time. If the courts wish to conflate legal and moral malice,
then the conflation of legal and moral malice will be the law.
Despite his failure to convince a majority of his colleagues on the
Massachusetts court, Holmes was generally right about the evolution of the
law of slander and libel from the Elizabethan period to his own. Also, given
the course the evolution took, he was probably right that the continuing use
of the word "malice" was unnecessarily confusing. On the other hand, he
was quite wrong to imply, as he seems to, that moral considerations played
no part in the evolution. The history is too complicated to take up here, but
I think it accords pretty well with the growing recognition elsewhere in the
law of torts that people ought to take responsibility for the natural
consequences of what they do. The great transition case according to Prosser
is Bromage v. Prosser° (1825), in which the King's Bench likened the
gratuitous undermining of people's reputations to the gratuitous maiming of
their cattle or poisoning of their fish. If you do something obviously harmful
for no good reason, you cannot be heard to say that you meant no harm. To
me, this looks like a moral principle. I believe that the other cases that
followed Bromage can be related to moral principles in the same way.
8.

"Suppose a contract is executed in due form and In writing to
deliver a lecture, mentioning no time. One of the parties thinks
that the promise will be construed to mean at once, within a week.
The other ihinks that It means when he is ready. The court says
that it means within a reasonable time." (p. 464)

Holmes takes this example as showing that the enforcement of contracts
is based not on a meeting of minds, but on a consonance of formalities. But
that is not in fact what it shows. Rather, it shows that if two parties sketch
out an agreement with terms missing, the court will supply reasonable terms
so the agreement will not fail. In deciding on reasonable terms, the court,
on the basis of common understanding, decides what would be a fair-i.e.,
moralm-way for either party to treat the other. Holmes has constructed his
hypothetical in such a way that the expectations of the parties are both
fatuous. They are therefore neither morally compelling nor legally binding.
But that is no reason for saying that the requirement that the court
establishes in their place is a mere formality, devoid of moral content.

10. 4 B. & C. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051; William L. Prosser, Prosseron Torts (1941),
p. 815.
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"For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if
every word of moral significance could be banished from the law
altogether, and other words substituted which should convey legal
ideas uncolored by anything outside the law." (p. 464)

I believe I have shown that it would not be a gain: that it would seriously
impair the intelligibility of the whole enterprise. Indeed, in the second part
of the essay, which begins with the paragraph following this language, we
shall see that Holmes himself cannot avoid words of moral significance
when he turns from "the limits of the law" to "the forces which determine
its content and its growth."
10. "Even if every decision required the sanction of an emperor with
despotic power and a whimsical turn of mind, we should be
interested none the less, still with a view to prediction, in
discovering some order, some rational explanation, and some
principle of growth for the rules which he laid down." (p. 465)
There is a certain amount of truth in this, but it is overstated. The
emperor's whimsical turn of mind may (and probably did under a leader

such as Idi Amin) reach the point where the predictive function can be
exercised better by a psychiatrist than by a lawyer. While Holmes is right

to say, as he is about to at this point, that mere logic is not adequate to
support legal analysis, there has to be a certain colorable rationality in the
material being analyzed if the analysis is to be called legal. I think there
must be some kind of moral element as well. One can accept a good deal
of what Holmes says about the distinction between law and morality, and
still believe that if an exercise of power has no modicum of moral
legitimacy, the work of analyzing it belongs to someone other than a

lawyer."
11. "Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth
and importance of competing legislative grounds .... " (p. 466)
"I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage." (p. 467)
It seems to me obvious that a judgment as to the relative worth and

importance of competing legislative grounds is a moral judgment, and

11. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), pp. 18-25.
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considerations of social advantage are moral considerations. Furthermore, in
referring to the duty of judges, Holmes must be thinking of a moral duty,
for under his definition of law judges cannot have a legal duty unless other
judges will make them carry it out. The inconsistency of this language with
Holmes's earlier strictures on the exclusion of moral considerations from the
law is evidently less striking to Holmes than it is to me. Perhaps the reason
is that Holmes's understanding of morality is different from mine. I suppose
that for a strict enough Kantian considerations of social advantage would be
quite different from moral considerations, 12 and perhaps Holmes is
thinking in Kantian terms when he deals with morality. Still; at this point
in his discussion, he is pretty far removed from his original enterprise of
predicting what the courts will do.

12. "We think it desirable to prevent one man's property being
misappropriated by another, and so we make larceny a crime." (p.
469)
Property is a legal concept. "One man's property" consists of those
objects that the law has assigned that man. But if we are to believe Holmes
in the first part of this essay, the way the law assigns property to a man is
by arranging to punish anybody who takes it away from him. It follows that
Holmes cannot be right in saying that we make larceny a crime in order to
prevent one man's property being misappropriated by another. Until we
made larceny a crime, nobody had any property for anyone else to
misappropriate.

13. "A slip corner is left open for thieves to contend, if indicted for
larceny, that they should have been indicted for embezzlement, and
if indicted for embezzlement, that they should have been indicted
for larceny, and to escape on that ground." (p. 470)
From the "bad man" standpoint that Holmes has bidden us adopt, in what
sense can a person who escapes punishment be a thief?

12. See Ivo Thomas, "The Growth of Legislative Morals," 19 Am J. Jur.(1974), p. 39.
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14. "I think that the law regards the infliction of temporal damage by
a responsible person as actionable if, under the circumstances
known to him the danger of the act is manifest according to
common experience, or according to his own experience if it is
more than common, except in cases where upon special grounds of
policy the law refuses to protect the plaintiff or grants a privilege
to the defendant." (p. 471)
This has to be a moral claim. The reason people are made to pay for the
harm they do is that they should not have done it. And that they should
have known it would be harmful seems a pretty good reason for saying they
should not have done it. I would suppose that the "special grounds of
policy" to which Holmes attributes the exceptions to his principle would
also be established on the basis of some moral claim.

15.

"If a man goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a
master of it means to look straight through all the dramatic
incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy.... I have in
mind cases in which the highest courts seem to me to have
floundered because they had no clear ideas on some of these
themes." (p. 475)

This passage brings into particularly sharp focus the discrepancy between
the two halves of the essay. The master of law is the one who can discern
the true basis for prophecy. But the true basis for prophecy of what? For
anyone who has read the essay up to this point, the answer has to be for
prophecy of what the courts will do in fact. But in that case, how can the
highest courts have floundered? A trial court or an intermediate appellate
court can presumably flounder by failing to predict the decisions of a court
to which its cases go on appeal. But a highest court can only flounder by
failing to predict its own decisions. If Holmes's clear ideas on this or that
theme are not shared by the highest courts he is concerned with, then, from
the standpoint of prophecy on which he continues to insist, the courts are
not floundering, Holmes is.

ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
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16. "The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts
of man." (p. 477)
Despite his professed opposition to natural law doctrine, Holmes offers
a rich supply of proof texts supporting it. This is one of my two
favorites.'* It is the culmination of a discussion of prescription in which
Holmes says that the prevailing legal doctrine is based on a primordial
human attitude toward something a person thinks is his own: "The
connection is further back than the first recorded history. It is in the nature
of man's mind." I gather that Holmes's understanding of philosophy kept
him from connecting judgments of this kind with natural law, just as it kept
him from connecting considerations of social advantage with morality. In his
little essay on natural law, 14 he distinguishes "Can't Helps" from "a priori
discernment" and seems to regard only the latter as natural law doctrine. For
Holmes then, one can fight and die for one's intuitions about human
nature,15 but one cannot philosophize about them.
I disagree with him strongly about the role of intuition in philosophy, but
I do not want to discuss that disagreement here. Rather, I want to suggest
that the language quoted here makes Holmes's philosophical rejection of
natural law inconsistent with the meaning of law as he established it at the
beginning of his essay. If law is a prediction of what the courts will do, and
if reflection on human nature will help us to make such a prediction, then
there is such a thing as natural law, regardless of its place in the
philosophical firmament. Holmes's failure to recognize that this is the case
is, I believe, a final example of his failure to make the two halves of his
essay consistent with one another.
The question of what to make of this essay has of course engaged the
attention of many people. Among the most recent are nine scholars whose
comments are appended to a republication of the essay itself in the March,
1997 issue of the Harvard Law Review. 16 Four of them draw on a combination of psychology and intellectual history. 17 On the one hand, Holmes
admired the industrial progress of the Gilded Age, the men who made it

13. The other is: "The law has grown, and even if historical mistakes have contributed
to its growth it has tended in the direction of rules consistent with human nature." Brown v.

United States, 256 U.S. 335. 343 (1921).
14. 32 Harv. L. Rev. (1918), p. 40.
15. See "The Soldier's Faith" (1895) in Speeches(1913), p. 56.
16. 110 Harv. L. Rev. (1997), p. 991.
17. William W. Fisher I1, "Interpreting Holmes," ibid., p. 1010; Robert W. Gordon,
"The Path of the Lawyer," ibid., p. 1013; Richard D. Parker, "The Mind of Darkness," ibid.,
p. 1033; G. Edward White, "Investing in Holmes at the Millennium," ibid., p. 1049. The
reference to social Darwinism is Fisher's, that to the friendship with Henry Adams is
Gordon's.
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happen, and the lawyers who served them: there were even hints of social
Darwinism in his attitude. On the other hand, he was a friend of Henry
Adams, and showed'on occasion the same wistful, fin de si~cle skepticism,
the same dim longing for an unattainable and probably nonexistent
transcendence.
Two commentators make Holmes a predecessor of postmodern deconstruction. 18 By demolishing the presuppositions that supported the legal
analysis of his time, Holmes made it possible for later generations to apply
political, social, economic, or even moral analysis to legal questions as they
arose.

The remaining three stress Holmes's preoccupation with science. 19 Like
many of his contemporaries, he defined the rational on the model of the
natural sciences. His object, therefore, was to sweep away the metaphysical
and obscurantist traditions of less enlightened times, and so clear the way
for a rational jurisprudence modelled on the natural sciences.
These different views all seem to focus mainly on what the authors
believe Holmes thought rather than on what he says here, and to reconstruct
his thought largely from evidence unrelated to this particular essay.
Furthermore, they all seem to belie the first sentence of the essay: "When
we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession."
Returning to the Picasso analogy, they seem to be making the essay
representational by having it represent something other than what it claims
to represent, which is law. Indeed, Judge Posner, one of the third category
of commentators as I have described them, says firmly that, "in Holmes's
view as articulated or implied in The Path of the Law, whatijudges do is not
law in any sense that the legal profession will recognize." 2 Posner is more
upfront about it than the others are, but I think they are all preserving either
the philosophical or the psychological coherence of the essay by
downplaying the simplicity of its reference to "the legal profession."
The article "Cubism" in the Encyclopedia Americana says this about
Picasso:
Perspective painting had insisted on a single, unified point of view: what
would be observed by a spectator standing in a fixed position before the
subject.
In Les Demoiselles. ..
1
will.

2

Picasso shifted the point of view at

18. Tracy E. Higgins, "Straying from the Path," ibid., p.1019; Martha Minow, "The Path
as Prologue," ibid., p. 1023.
19. Sheldon M. Novick, "Holmes's Path, Holmes's Goal," ibid., p. 1028; Richard A.
Posner, "The Path Away from the Law," ibid., p. 1039; David Rosenberg, "The Path not
Taken," ibid., p. 1044.
20. Ibid., p. 1041.
21. H.H. Amason, "Cubism," 8 Ency. Amer. (1986), p. 307.
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I believe something of this kind is going on here. Classical jurisprudence,
like perspective painting, insisted on a single, unified point of view.
Whether you study law from Blackstone's Commentaries or Langdell's
casebooks, it is a system of rules: do this, don't do that, and your position
is that of a detached observer scrutinizing the rules in some orderly fashion.
But Holmes, like Picasso, shifts the point of view at will. He invites you at
different places in his essay to be student, professor, bad man, lawyer,
judge, social scientist, historian, philosopher, and even mystic, and to ask
from each standpoint, "What if this happens?" and "What shall I do about
that?"
Whatever the metaphysical or epistemological objections to Holmes's
shifting viewpoints, "The Path of the Law" has taught important lessons that
lawyers of later generations are not apt to forget. The most important is that
people go to lawyers for help with their practical concerns. It is a good
thing for lawyers to know that, and a good thing for law schools to teach
them. For the purpose, they must learn not to rest on the conceptual
elegance of their analysis of legal questions, and not to conflate law and
morality. There is an important place for both conceptual and moral analysis
in dealing with a typical legal problem, but we must be careful in the
process not to forget what the problem is.
Also, law has power behind it. Therefore, legal questions are never mere
questions of how people ought to behave: they are always questions about
how power can and should be deployed. By deploying power we make
things happen, both in this or that case and in society generally. Some of the
things we make happen will be good and others will not be. Therefore, it
behooves us when we deal with a legal question to figure out what will
happen if we decide it in this way or that, and whether we want that to
happen.
What is important about these lessons is that they have always been major
concerns of lawyers, legislators, and judges, whereas the prevailing
jurisprudence of Holmes's time tended to neglect them. In "The Path of the
Law," Holmes brought them all to our attention in an elegant, indeed,
unforgettable package. But he did not tell us how to organize them
coherently. On that we are still at work.

